In this paper, we develop a privacy implementation for symbolic control systems. Such systems generate sequences of non-numerical data, and these sequences can be represented by words or strings over a finite alphabet. This work uses the framework of differential privacy, which is a statistical notion of privacy that makes it unlikely that privatized data will reveal anything meaningful about underlying sensitive data. To bring differential privacy to symbolic control systems, we develop an exponential mechanism that approximates a sensitive word using a randomly chosen word that is likely to be near it. The notion of "near" is given by the Levenshtein distance, which counts the number of operations required to change on string into another. We then develop a Levenshtein automaton implementation of our exponential mechanism that efficiently generates privatized output words. This automaton has letters as its states, and this work develops transition probabilities among these states that give overall output words obeying the distribution required by the exponential mechanism. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate this technique for both strings of English words and runs of a deterministic transition system, demonstrating in both cases that privacy can be provided in this setting while maintaining a reasonable degree of accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
As control applications have become increasingly reliant upon user data, there has arisen interest in protecting individuals' privacy in some applications, e.g., in smart power grids [1] , [2] . In response, there has been some work on privacy in control, and sensitive user data have been made private in multi-agent control systems [3] , [4] , convex optimization [5] , [6] , [7] , linear-quadratic control [8] , and a range of filtering and estimation problems [9] , [10] . All of these problems protect sensitive numerical data by adding carefully calibrated noise to such data before they are shared.
However, methods based on additive noise do not readily extend to non-numerical data, nor to sequences of them. Symbolic control systems generate sequences of nonnumerical data, which are analogous to trajectories for ordinary control systems, and these are typically represented as words or strings over a finite alphabet. A symbolic trajectory can represent, for example, a switching sequence prescribing modes to switch between in a hybrid control system [11] , or a sequence of finite subsets of state space to occupy, such as in a path planning problem [12] . A symbolic trajectory can potentially reveal one's actions or positions over time, and this setting incurs privacy concerns similar to those with trajectories of numerical data.
In this paper we develop a general-purpose method for providing differential privacy to sensitive words (sequences of symbols) generated by symbolic control systems. Differential privacy is a statistical notion of privacy that makes it unlikely for an eavesdropper or adversary to learn anything meaningful about sensitive data from its differentially private form [13] . Its key features include immunity to post-processing, in that transformations of privatized data to not weaken privacy guarantees, and robustness to side information, in that learning additional information about data-producing entities does not weaken differential privacy by much.
Differential privacy has been applied to non-numerical data using the exponential mechanism, which randomly generates responses to non-numerical queries based on how well those responses approximate the non-private response [14] , [15] , [16] , [13] , [14] . To bring privacy to the symbolic control setting, we will develop an exponential mechanism for words over a finite alphabet.
The first contribution of this paper is formally defining differential privacy for words (sequences of symbols) via the Levenshtein distance. The Levenshtein distance counts how many insertions, substitutions, and deletions are required to change one word into another. Given a sensitive word (representing a sensitive symbolic trajectory), our differential privacy implementation therefore outputs nearby words (in the Levenshtein sense) with high probability and, conversely, outputs distant words with low probability. In this paper, we consider the substitution Levenshtein distance, which allows substitutions but not insertions or deletions, and we defer use of the full Levenshtein distance to a future publication.
The second contribution of this paper then comes from the exponential mechanism itself. for a given sensitive word, we provide the distribution over possible output words required to implement differential privacy.
In the third contribution, we specify a more efficient means of generating differentially private output words. that precludes the need to compute all pair-wise Levenshtein distances between words of a fixed length for a fixed alphabet. We show how to construct a Levenshtein automaton that generates output words one letter at a time in a manner that obeys the probability distribution required by differential privacy.
An expanded version of this paper which includes proofs and more results may be found at [17] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define our notation and establish some mathematical preliminaries for the developments below.
A. Languages, Automata, and Transition Systems
An alphabet is a collection of symbols Σ. A word over Σ is a concatenation of symbols w = w 0 w 1 . . . such that w i ∈ Σ for all i. We use the notation Σ * to denote to the set of all finite words over Σ. Any subset L ⊆ Σ * (equivalently L ∈ 2 Σ * ) is called a finite language. Definition 1: A (nondeterministic) finite state automaton (NFA) is a tuple A = (Q, Σ, q 0 , δ, F ), where Q is a set of states, Σ is an input alphabet, q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is the transition relation between states, and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states. An NFA with deterministic transition relation δ ⊆ Q × Σ → Q is called a deterministic finite state automaton (DFA) .
Automaton A accepts a word w if the final state of the induced run is an accepting state q f ∈ F . We call the set of all words accepted by the automaton its language, denoted by L(A).
Definition 3: A deterministic transition system (DTS) is given as a tuple T S = (S, s 0 , Act, T ), where S is a finite state space,s 0 ∈ S is an initial state, Act is an input set, and T : S × A → S is a deterministic transition function such that applying input a 1 in state s 1 will move the system to state T (s 1 , a 1 ).
Definition 4: A plan for a DTS is a sequence of actions a = a 0 a 1 a 2 . . . ∈ Act * . A plan a is in the input language of a DTS, denoted a ∈ L i (T S), if it induces a run r(a) = s 0 s 1 . . . ∈ S * such that s 0 = s 0 and s i+1 = T (s i , a i ) ∀i.
B. Levenshtein Distances and Automata
Definition 5 (Levenshtein Distance [18] ): The Levenshtein distance between words w 1 , w 2 , denoted d L (w 1 , w 2 ), is the minimum number of changesinsertions, substitutions, or deletions-that can be applied to w 1 to convert it to w 2 .
For example, the Levenshtein distance between "sample" and "examples" is 3, since the "s" at the beginning of "sample" must be substituted for an "e" or an "x," the remaining letter ("e" or "x", whichever was not substituted for the "s") must be added, and an "s" must be added to the end of the word. We can identify whether a string is within a specific Levenshtein distance of another string using a Levenshtein automaton.
Definition 6 (Levenshtein Automaton [19] ): For a string x and a k ∈ N, the Levenshtein automaton is an NFA A x,k = (Q, Σ, q 0 , δ, F ) such that L(A k ) is the set of all words with Levenshtein distance less than or equal to k from x.
Remark 1: In this paper, for simplicity, we only consider substitutions and ignore insertions and deletions. We call this distance the substitution Levenshtein distance d s L , which is equal to the Hamming distance [20] .
Remark 2: The automaton A x,k can be pruned to a DFA that accepts only those words whose length is the same as the length of the input word, |x|, denoted A |x| x,k , as shown in Figure 1 . 
C. Differential Privacy
The underlying goal of differential privacy is to make similar pieces of sensitive data produce outputs with approximately equal probability distributions. The definition of "similar" for sensitive data is specified by an adjacency relation, e.g., closeness in terms the p -metric on a space of trajectories [9] or the counting metric on the space of databases [13] . Differential privacy requires that adjacent sensitive data produce approximately indistinguishable outputs. More formally, for adjacent sensitive data D 1 and D 2 , a randomized map M provides -differential privacy if
for all S ⊆ range(M ). The parameter controls the degree of indistinguisability between the distributions of M (D 1 ) and M (D 2 ), and thus the degree of privacy afforded to users. Smaller values of provide stronger privacy guarantees, and typical values range from 0.1 to ln 3.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide the essential privacy definitions that underlie this work and formally state the problems we consider here.
A. Word Differential Privacy
Here, we define a novel concept of differential privacy, called word differential privacy, that is appropriate for describing privacy for sequences of states in symbolic systems.
Definition 7 (Word adjacency): The adjacency relation between words w 1 , w 2 ∈ Σ * is defined as
(2) Definition 8 (Substition Word adjacency): The substitution adjacency relation between words w 1 , w 2 ∈ Σ * is defined as
Definition 10 (Substitution Word Differential Privacy):
Essentially, a word differential privacy mechanism approximates sensitive sequences of symbols with randomized versions of them. These randomizations must have similar distributions for two sequences that are nearby (in sense of Definitions 7 and 8), and this is captured by the relationships between probability distributions in Definitions 9 and 10. Nearby symbolic trajectories are therefore made approximately indistinguishable to any recipient of their privatized forms, as well as any eavesroppers who gain access to them. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to substitution word differential privacy.
B. Problems
Here, we consider two problems involving substitution word differential privacy. First, we consider the problem of synthesizing a differentially private mechanism for an arbitrary sequence of characters from a given alphabet Problem 1: Fix a probability space (Ω, F, Pr). Given an alphabet Σ and a word w, find a mechanism M w : Σ * ×Ω → Σ * that is substitution word -differentially private.
Next, as a first step towards differential privacy for symbolic systems, we consider how to synthesize a mechanism for privatizing runs of a deterministic transition system. Problem 2: Fix a probability space (Ω, F, Pr). Given a transition system DT S and a run x, find a mechanism M w,DT S : Σ * × Ω → L(DT S) that is substitution word -differentially private.
A solution to Problem 2 would enable a designer to privatize a desired run of a deterministic transition system such that an agent that observes repeated executions can determine the desired trajectory only up to bounded precision. The price that must be paid for this is, of course, deviating from the desired run. This relationship between performance and privacy is handled by tuning the single parameter .
IV. THE EXPONENTIAL MECHANISM FOR WORDS
In this section we define the exponential mechanism for words over a finite alphabet. We first define the notion of utility we use for our privacy implementation, and then we bound the sensitivity of this utility. With this sensitivity bound established, we then formally define the distribution from which words should be drawn in order to preserve differential privacy. Section IV-D below then provides the means of efficiently generating samples from this distribution.
A. Utility for Words in a Language
An exponential mechanism is defined with respect to a utility function, which quantifies the quality of each possible output. The choice of utility function here should therefore reflect the quality of outputting a certain word in response to a given sensitive input word. In this work, we seek to privatize the input word by randomly outputting a word which is close to it by using the substitution Levenshtein utility.
Definition 11: (Substitution Levenshtein Utility) Fix a constant α > 0, an alphabet Σ, and a language L ∈ 2 Σ * . Then, for an input word w i ∈ L, outputting the word w o ∈ L provides Substitution Levenshtein utility equal to
Here, the inclusion of α ensures that u α is always defined, and smaller values of α will give higher values of u α when w o is close to w i . This choice of utility has the benefit of decreasing rapidly as output words disagree more with the input word, which will more strongly bias the output of the exponential mechanism toward better output words while maintaining privacy.
B. Sensitivity Bounds
The next step in defining the exponential mechanism is to calculate the sensitivity of the utility function u α . In particular, for a fixed output word w o , we must provide a bound on how much u α (·, w o ) can differ across two adjacent input words, and this bound will be used in defining the distribution over possible output words below. That is, we must bound the quantity
Lemma 1: Fix α > 0 and k ∈ N. Then
The proof of this lemma is contained in the Technical Report [17] . 
for q ∈ ActiveQ, (q, σ, q ) ∈ δ x, do 10:
11:
CurrQ ← ActiveQ
12:
counter ← counter + 1 return µ x, 0 0 ,12 start 1 0 ,4 
C. Distribution Over Output Words
Given the above bound on sensitivity, the final step needed to define the exponential mechanism is determining the required distribution over output words. The standard definition of the exponential mechanism [13] says that, for a given sensitive input word x, a candidate word w should be output with probability p(w; x) satisfying the relation
For the case of word adjacency, one would need to determine a proportionality constant K x , which requires computing the distance to every possible output word from every possible sensitive input word x, which can easily become intractable for large alphabets or longer words. [21] . However, for substitution word adjacency, explicitly computing K x can be avoided as shown in the next section.
D. Generating Differentially Private Words from A Fixed Alphabet
In this section, we propose an efficient method for generating samples w ∼ p( · ; x). We propose to do this by synthesizing appropriate randomized policies µ ,x : Q×Σ → [0, 1] over the Levenshtein automaton associated with word x, and these policies will randomly select each letter in an output word to implement the exponential mechanism for words. Formally, we have the following formulation.
Problem 3: Given a Levenshtein automaton A |x| k,x , synthesize a policy µ ,x such that |x| e=0 µ ,x (q e , σ e ) = p(σ 0:k ; x).
(10)
Note that in this approach, we are restricting ourselves to generating privatized output words w that are the same length as x and are allowing arbitrary symbols from an alphabet Σ to be selected. That is, we are privatizing words in the language L = Σ |x| . This means that ∆u α achieves its maximum value k α(k+α) as long as k ≤ |x|. Given these assumptions, we propose the following procedure for indirectly synthesizing µ ,x .
1) For a given input word x and an adjacency relation Adj s w,k , fix a desired substitution Levenshtein distance by drawing from the distribution µ ,x, (q e , σ e ) = π |x|, ,Σ ∀q 0 . . . q |x| ∈ L(A k,x, ) (12)
The procedure outlined in Algorithm 1 uses this principle to construct µ x, . We assign a function V : Q x, → N such that V (q) is the number of unique paths from q that end in q |x|, . Then, the weighting of the policy at each point is equal to the proportion of unique paths that can be reached by applying the symbol compared to the total number of unique paths reachable from the current state.
E. Generating Differentially Private Runs for a Transition System
Here, we extend the principles used to generate differentially private words to generate differentially private runs of a system via the product Levenshtein automaton.
Definition 12: Let A |x| x,k = (Q, Σ, q 0 , δ, F ) be a Levenshtein automaton and let T S = (S, s 0 , Σ, T ) be a deterministic transition system. The Product Levenshtein Automaton, That is, every accepting word in the product corresponds to a sequence of inputs that when applied to T S will result in a run that is within substitution Levenshtein distance k of w. An example of a product Levenshtein automaton is shown in Figure 3(b) .
Because the product Levenshtein automaton is a Levenshtein automaton, we can use the exact same procedure as in Section IV-D with using A |x| x,k,T S instead of A |x| x,k and ensuring that the maximum distance used to compute ρ is the minimum of k and max v∈Li(T S) d L (v, x). An example of applying Algorithm 1 to A |x| x,k,T S is shown in Figure 3 (c).
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present results of some computational experiments that demonstrate the procedures in Sections IV-D and IV-E. We developed a package in the Julia programming language called LevenshteinPrivacy.jl that implements the procedures in Sections IV-D and IV-E. The code uses the LightGraphs.jl framework. All experiments were performed on a Windows Desktop PC with a 1.90 GHz processor and 16.0GB of RAM.
A. Case Study 1: Strings
For this set of experiments, we demonstrate the procedure from Section IV-D by generating differentially private versions of the string "american control conference 2019". The Levenshtein automaton contains 561 states and 1056 edges. The automaton was constructed in 6.6s and generating 40 privatized strings required 1.53s of computation time. Figure  4a shows outputs from these experiments with different values of the privacy parameter . As we can see, as decreases (strength of privacy increases), the outputs become less recognizable until they become almost entirely gibberish.
B. Case Study 2: Transition System
In this case study, we demonstrate the procedure outlined in Section IV-E. We constructed a transition system with 225 states and edges that corresponds to a 15 by 15 "grid world". The path we wish to privatize is shown in Figure 4b (i). The resulting product automaton constructed by Algorithm has 6194 states and 18762 edges. The computation time for constructing the product automaton was 193s and the time required to generate 100 samples with = 0.01 was 6.4s.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we presented a method for providing differential privacy to words over a finite alphabet. An exponential mechanism was devised to generate possible output words and we devised a procedure to efficiently generate samples from this distribution. Numerical results validated these theoretical developments and demonstrated their efficiency.
The first natural extension of this work is to the full Levenshtein distance, which will allow for not only substitutions as in this work, but also deletions and insertions. A key challenge to doing this will be developing algorithms that provide statistical guarantees under the non-determinism inherent in the un-restricted Levenshtein automaton. However, such a method would greatly expand the types of outputs from symbolic systems that can be privatized. Fig. 4 : (a) Samples of differentially private versions of the string "american control conference 2019" generated with different values of the privacy parameter . (b) (i) Input trajectory (ii)-(iii) Example trajectories generated by differentially private mechanism with = 5.
